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Abstract 
We study the effects of both mandatory and voluntary trading suspensions on stock prices, 
volatility and trading volume in China’s stock market. It is found that both voluntary and 
mandatory suspensions generate negative abnormal returns. Trading volume and volatility rise 
significantly in the post-suspension period. Our results suggest that suspensions are not effective 
in calming down investors in China. Ownership structure and duration of suspension explain the 
ineffectiveness of suspensions. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of individual stock trading suspensions is common across global stock exchanges 
to ensure that all investors have equal access to market information so as to protect their interests.  
While this kind of suspension is not rare in China, many investors criticize the listed companies 
for initiating trading suspensions too extensively and the exchange for halting trading too 
frequently. In July 2017, MSCI warned of the prolonged trading suspensions of Chinese 
companies and removed those suspended for more than 50 days from its emerging market index 
(Reuters, 30 July 2017). 
Proponents claim that trading suspensions ensure more equitable information 
dissemination and order execution; therefore, calling a trading halt can reduce possible excessive 
price fluctuations and allow orderly, equitable trading in financial markets (Kryzanowski, 1979; 
Greenwald and Stein, 1991; Lee et al., 1994; Chen et al., 2003; Chakrabarty et al., 2011). On the 
other hand, opponents suggest that trading suspensions block the chance to trade (Lee et al., 1994; 
Kim et al., 2008). 
Despite the abundance of the existing literature on trading suspensions of developed 
markets in the US, Canada, and Europe, there are fewer studies investigating the effects of 
trading suspensions in emerging markets (Abad and Pascual, 2013)2. Our paper adds to the 
literature by analyzing the effects of trading suspension in China, a large emerging market 
economy that is playing an increasingly significant role in the global economy. 
The case of China is well-suited to examine the effects of trading suspension in emerging 
markets. First, because China exhibits almost all of the notable features that characterize 
emerging market countries, understanding China could help us to understand the effects of 
                                            
2 Abad and Pascual (2013) show that most studies on trading suspensions have referred to developed financial markets in the US, 
Canada, and Europe. In contrast, empirical studies in emerging markets have typically focused on the effects of price limit.  
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trading suspension in emerging market countries in general. For example, unlike developed 
markets where specialists provide a substantial liquidity, the Chinese stock market adopt an 
electronic automated trading system, which is typical for emerging markets. This allows us to 
investigate the effects of trading suspension without the interference of specialists. Individual 
investors dominate in Chinese stock market, a feature common to emerging economies (Liu and 
Wang, 2018). Studying the stock market dominated by individual investors can complement the 
other literature in trading suspension. Second, studying trading suspension in an emerging 
market country such as China offers unique perspectives that are not available in studies of 
developed countries. Listed firms in China’s stock markets are allowed to suspend trading for 
theirs stocks. There is a large number of issuer-initiated suspensions (voluntary), while the 
number of regulator-initiated suspensions (mandatory) remains small. In fact, voluntary 
suspensions consist of more than 97% of all suspensions in China’s stock markets. Investigating 
the effects of frequent voluntary suspensions may offer new insights to the efficiency of trading 
suspensions. 
In this paper, we investigate trading suspensions in China and assess whether or not the 
suspension is called to avoid future decline of stock prices. Specifically, the effectiveness of 
trading suspensions is evaluated in three aspects: price discovery process, changes in return 
volatility and changes in trading volume. In addition, this paper divides the whole sample into 
mandatory suspensions and voluntary suspensions subsamples, and investigates the factors that 
explain the differences between them.  
The extant literature includes only a few studies that have investigated the effects of 
trading suspensions in emerging markets. Bacha et al., (2008) investigate efficiency of trading 
halts in Malaysia and show that trading suspension will lead to positive price reaction, increased 
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volume and volatility. Tan and Yeo (2003) investigate the effects of trading halts on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange. They find that the ‘good news’ group experience significantly 
positive abnormal returns around the event date, while the ‘bad news’ group suffers a prolonged 
decline. Xu et al., (2014) assessed the effects of trading halts on absolute return, trading volume 
and bid-ask spread using high-frequency data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Our analysis 
extends this literature in several dimensions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study 
represents the first attempt to comprehensively investigate the efficiency of mandatory and 
voluntary trading suspensions in China. Second, we carefully investigate the patterns of stock 
price, volatility and trading volume before and after trading suspensions and relate them to 
corporate governance, accounting variables and suspension duration. Finally, we investigate the 
importance of ownership structure on the effects of trading suspensions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the sample. 
Detailed methodology and empirical results are reported in section 3. The final section 
summarizes and concludes.   
2. Data and Sample Description  
There are two stock exchanges, namely the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, in China. The main provisions regarding trading suspension in China was stipulated 
in Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks by Exchange and directed in Guidance on Improving 
the Stock Suspension and Resumption System of Listed Companies by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange were implemented in January 1998, and amended in May 2000, 
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June 2001, February 2002, December 2004, May 2006, September 2008, July 2012, December 
2013, October 2014 and April 2018.3 
The regulations in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are similar in 
many aspects. According to the regulations, suspension categories can be generally divided into 
two main types. The listed companies can request to the corresponding Exchanges for trading 
suspension with an explanation. We call the issuer-initiated suspension “voluntary suspension”. 
This type of suspension is often related with the release of price-sensitive information, asset 
restructuring, and general meeting of shareholders. For instance, both stock exchanges permit a 
suspension in the following circumstances: (1) when a listed company forecasts that it would be 
difficult to keep any price-sensitive information confidential prior to disclosure; (2) when the 
company is undergo offer negotiation, major asset restructuring, merges or acquisition; (3) when 
the company has an abnormal situation during the general meeting of shareholders; (4) when 
suspension is necessary to maintain an orderly market. The stock exchanges require the company 
to announce its reason and time of the suspension, and permit to initiate the suspension when the 
stock exchanges consider the suspension is reasonable. In addition, the securities regulatory 
authorities may also force the stock to suspend and resume on reasonable grounds. We call the 
regulator-initiated suspension “mandatory suspension”. Both the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and stock exchanges have authority to suspend stock trading. According to 
the regulations, the mandatory suspension is often associated with unfavorable news of listed 
companies, such as failure of complying with listing regulations, price manipulation, violation of 
                                            
3  The Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks are available at the website of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(http://www.sse.com.cn/lawandrules/sserules/listing/stock/c/c_20181116_4678354.shtml ) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(http://www.szse.cn/lawrules/rule/company/public/P020180724361500737638.pdf ) receptively. Guidance on Improving the 
Stock Suspension and Resumption System of Listed Companies (CSRC Announcement [2018] No. 34) is available at 
the website of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201811/t20181106_346305.htm). 
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rules, fraud, information leaking out in public media, risk warning, insufficient securities in the 
hands, etc. For most cases, the suspension begins at the same date that stock exchanges permit or 
force the stock to suspend, and ends at the date when the related events was settled with a 
disclosure report or announcement4.  
Our initial sample covers all trading suspensions in China’s A-share market of 2964 stocks, 
identified from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, from May 
2005 to September 2016. The initial data were chosen in a way consistent with the end of the 
non-tradable shares reform (He et al., 2016) 5. And the last event is satisfied with leaving over 60 
trading days to calculate abnormal return. In order to compare mandatory suspensions with 
voluntary suspensions, we exclude the suspensions due to delisting. We also exclude cases where 
two consecutive suspensions of the same company occur within a 30-day period. The final 
sample consists of 36,544 trading suspensions, consists of 2690 A-share stock. 
Figure 1 describes suspension events over the sample period. It is noteworthy that the 
numbers of suspensions decreases substantially since 2012. As part of the reason, China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) continued to amend some rules about improving the 
stock suspension and resumption system of listed companies and shortening suspension period 
and frequency from 20126. CSRC clearly expresses that it is ought to reduce the frequency of 
suspension and enhance market liquidity. 
                                            
4 There is a slight difference of regulating suspensions between Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. When a listed 
company fails to disclose quarterly report or correct falsehoods on time, Shenzhen Stock Exchange requests the stock to suspend 
at the same day, while Shanghai Stock Exchange requests the stock to suspend at the next trading day. 
5 The reform is designed to float nontradable legal person shares through the open market. Such legal person shares could, under 
the reform program, be converted to tradable A-shares. As a result, the stock liquidity of firms listed before 2005 is different from 
those after 2005. 
6 The amendments include Interim Provisions on Strengthening Supervision over Abnormal Transaction of Stocks Related to 
Major Asset Restructuring of Listed Companies (CSRC Announcement [2012] No. 33), Decision on Amending the Interim 
Provisions on Strengthening Supervision over Abnormal Transaction of Stocks Related to Major Asset Restructuring of Listed 
Companies (CSRC Announcement [2016] No. 16), Guidance on Improving the Stock Suspension and Resumption System of 
Listed Companies(CSRC Announcement [2018] No. 34). 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Our mandatory suspensions subsample covers 917 (2.5%) events, and the voluntary 
subsample covers 35,627 events (97.5%). The whole sample is divided into four categories based 
on the suspensions reason of CSMAR: 1) announcement suspension, 2) special suspension, 3) 
additional issuance plans, and 4) shareholders’ meeting, while mandatory suspensions all belong 
to the second category. Daily stock prices, trading volume, market returns, length of suspension, 
and accounting variables and industry type are all obtained from the CSMAR database7. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. It shows that the frequency of 
suspension reasons in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are quite similar. In terms of 
suspensions types, additional issuance plans is the least category while shareholder’s meeting 
and special suspensions are most common in China. Table 2 reports the distribution of 
suspension duration. Suspensions vary from one hour to more than three months, depending on 
the reason for suspension. We use hour as the unit of suspension length since the minimum 
suspension period is one hour. Since the transaction hours in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange is 9:30-11:30am and 1:30-3:30pm, a four-hour’s halt is equivalent to one day’s halt. 
We have noticed that the issuer-initiated suspensions tend to last longer and exhibit greater 
variability in length than regulator-initiated suspensions. The average suspension length is about 
one day for a regulator-initiated halt and six days for an issuer-initiated halt. Since the statistics 
are significantly influenced by a number of long suspensions, using median duration would 
better indicate the average suspension length. As shown in the table, the median suspension 
period is one day for both the mandatory group and the voluntary group. In terms of Exchange, 
                                            
7 Note that the information of sub categories of announcement suspension is not available. We can’t analyze separately 
announcement suspensions due to merge & acquisitions or private placement. 
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we observe that suspensions in Shenzhen Stock Exchange tend to last longer and exhibit greater 
variability in length. But from median views, suspensions in both Exchange last one day. 
Considering the durations by suspensions types, special suspensions tend to last longest, whose 
average suspension days is more than 65 hours that is over 16 days and median suspension days 
is four days. And Additional issuance plans is second longer suspension. The average and median 
length is 13.94 hours and 12 hours receptively. The announcement suspension and shareholder’s 
meeting suspension are similar in average length, nearly one day. But suspensions due to 
shareholder’s meeting exhibit smaller volatility.    
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Value Effects 
In this section we investigate the value effects of suspensions. If the market is 
semi-strong efficient, we would expect that the price will be adjusted within the suspension 
period, thus there is no excess-returns during pre- and post-suspension periods.  
We use the method of Wu (1998) to measure the performance of suspended stocks. Daily 
returns on each individual suspended stock are calculated up to 30 days before and 30 days after 
the suspension, using the buy-and-hold strategy suggest by Ritter(1991) and Michaely et al. 
(1995). For each suspended stock, excess return for a given period is defined as the 
geometrically compounded return on the stock minus the corresponding geometrically 
compounded return on the CSI 300 Index. The buy-and-hold return for a stock is  
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ܴ௜ሺ௧,்ሻ ൌ ሾෑሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜௧ሻ െ 1ሿ ∗ 100
்
௧ୀ௔
																																ሺ1ሻ 
where ݎ௜௧ is the return on stock ݅ at time ݐ, and ܴ௜ሺ௧,்ሻ is the holding period return on stock ݅ 
from time ݐ to ܶ. The market return, ܴ௠ሺ௧,்ሻ, is calculated using the same method. The excess 
return for a stock from time ݐ to ܶ is then defined as  
ܧܴ௜ሺ௧,்ሻ ൌ ܴ௜ሺ௧,்ሻ െ ܴ௠ሺ௧,்ሻ																																																ሺ2ሻ 
The average excess return for a holding period from time ݐ to ܶ is then  
ܧܴሺ௧,்ሻതതതതതതതതത ൌ 1ܰ෍ܧܴ௜ሺ௧,்ሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
																																																			ሺ3ሻ 
where ܰ is the number of suspended stocks in the period. 
Then, we take the actual number of suspension days of each halt as the holding period, 
compute the nominal returns over the suspension period and subtract the market return over the 
same period. The excess return for a stock during a suspension period is  
ܧܴ௜଴ ൌ ቈ݌௜,்ାଵ݌௜,ଵ ቉
ଵ
்ାଵ െ	ቈ݌௠,்ାଵ݌௠,ଵ ቉
ଵ
்ାଵ 																																				ሺ4ሻ 
where ܧܴ௜଴ is the excess return over the suspension period for stock ݅, 	݌௜,ଵ	and ݌௜,்ାଵ are 
prices of stock ݅ on the last trading day before the suspension and the first trading day after the 
suspension, ݌௠,ଵ	and ݌௠,்ାଵ	are the CSI 300 Index on the last trading day before the suspension 
and the first trading day after the suspension respectively, and ܶ is the number of days the 
suspension lasts.  
Since the suspensions events could be cross-sectionally dependent and non-normally 
distributed, the ordinary event-study test may cause underestimation of the mean excess return 
variance. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a non-parametric test. Following Wu (1998), we 
provide a nonparametric rank statistics-Wilcoxon signed rank test. This test use the median to 
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avoid the misspecification due to asymmetry in the cross-sectional abnormal returns and 
non-normal distribution under the assumption of unknown distribution. As empirical results can 
be very sensitive to the changes in the estimation period and sample size, we also implement 
various sensitivity tests of the results. 
Table 3 presents the estimations of excess returns around the suspension, with Panel A 
revealing that both mandatory and voluntary subsamples have significant price changes. During 
the pre-suspension period, both mandatory and voluntary suspensions show negative excess 
returns, while mandatory suspensions indicate a larger downfall (-0.42% from -10 to -1) 
compared with voluntary suspensions (-0.082% from -10 to -1). Mandatory suspensions present 
a similar pattern as voluntary suspensions in the post-suspension period. The overall 
post-suspension effects for both mandatory and voluntary suspensions are negative (for event 
window [1, 30]). Interestingly, the significance around the suspension day (day 0) is smaller than 
around any other day. The signed rank test indicate similar result in both sign and significance of 
coefficients. Figure 2 represents the distribution of excess return around the suspension day for 
both types of suspensions. 
[Figure 2, Table 3 about here] 
We divide voluntary suspensions into good-news suspensions and bad-news suspensions 
according to the excess return on day 0. If the excess return on day 0 is positive, then it is a 
good-news suspension; otherwise it is a bad-news suspension. For the good-news subsample, 
price starts to rise 10 days before (0.28% for [-10, -1]) until 10 days after the resumption of 
trading (0.065% for [1, 10]). In contrast to the valuation effect of good-news subsample, the 
bad-news subsample indicates a different pattern. Price starts to fall one month before (-2.25% 
for [-30, -1]). On the one hand, it may indicate a leak of information; on the other hand, since 
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these are issuer-initiated suspensions, the companies may suspend the stocks so as to slow down 
the price decline. The biggest fall appears one day after the resumption of trading of the stock, 
and the declining trend continues in the post-suspension period, which may be even fiercer 
compared with that in the pre-suspension period (See from -0.77% for [1, 10] and -0.43% for 
[-10, -1]). This can be explained by the incomplete market reaction of bad-news suspensions: as 
a trading halt reduces liquidity during the suspension period, after the resumption of trading, 
people will try to sell the stocks at a lower price in order to change their positions.  
3.2 Return Volatility 
We use the volatility prior to the suspension as a reference to compare the volatility after 
the suspension (Greenwald and Stein, 1991; Frino et al., 2011). We first estimate the variances of 
daily returns for the suspended stocks over the pre- and post-suspension periods separately. Then 
we use the variance of daily stock returns as our measure of stock price volatility and compute 
the variance ratio, which is defined as  
VARTIAO ൌ ߪ୮୭ୱ୲
ଶ
ߪ୮୰ୣଶ െ 1					,																																																	ሺ5ሻ 
where	σ୮୰ୣଶ 	and σ୮୭ୱ୲ଶ 	 are the variances in the pre- and post-suspension periods respectively. 
Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the results of volatility changes for the whole sample. We 
find that return volatility after a trading suspension is significantly higher. VARTIAOs for the 
mandatory and voluntary samples over days -15 to +15 are 0.25 and 0.67 with t-value 17.42 and 
27.53 respectively, indicating that volatility is higher for voluntary suspensions than for 
mandatory suspensions. The difference between mandatory and voluntary subsamples is 
statistically significant (t-value: -2.78). However, changes in volatility are also influenced by the 
estimation period and sample size. For mandatory suspensions, VARTIAOs are higher when 
measured in a short event window (e.g., 30 days) than when measured in a long event window 
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(e.g., 120 days), vice versa for voluntary suspensions. Panel B summarizes the results for 
volatility changes of the four specific voluntary suspension types. For announcement suspensions, 
the significance of change in volatility increases. However, for shareholder’s meeting and 
additional issuance plan suspensions, the significance of change in volatility decreases. These 
phenomena all suggest that high volatility in post-suspension periods may not be temporary.  
[Table 4 about here] 
3.3 Trading Volume 
Following Wu (1998) and Engelen and Kabir (2006), high return volatility in the 
post-suspension period reflects a correspondingly high trading volume in the post-suspension 
period. We measure the trading volume of each stock for a 30-day period before and after the 
event day to examine the turnover rate around suspensions. Following Michaely et al. (1995) we 
first calculate the normal trading turnover for each stock as the benchmark, defined as the ratio 
of daily turnover to normal turnover over the estimation period from day-60 to day-31:  
																												ܶ ௜ܱ௧ ൌ ்ோ஽௏ை௅೔೟்ௌ೔ 		݅ ൌ 1.2… .ܰ, ܽ݊݀	ݐ ൌ െ60,െ59,… ,െ31																										ሺ6ሻ  
where ܴܶܦܸܱܮ௜௧ is the number of traded shares of stock ݅ at time ݐ, and ܶ ௜ܵ	is the number of 
outstanding shares of stock ݅ at time t. The daily average turnover across firms is then  
ܱܶ௧ ൌ 1ܰ෍ܶ ௜ܱ௧
ே
௜ୀଵ
		,																																																		ሺ7ሻ 
where ܰ denotes the number of suspended firms in the sample. Then we calculate the average 
trading volume across all sample days:  
ܱܶതതതത ൌ 1ܶ ෍ ܱܶ௧
ିଷଵ
௧ୀି଺଴
					,																																															ሺ8ሻ 
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where ܶ is the number of days in the estimation window. The abnormal trading turnover (ܣ ௧ܸ) 
and standard deviation (ܵܦ௧) are defined as 
ܣ ௧ܸ ൌ ܱܶ௧ܱܶതതതത െ 1								ݐ ൌ െ30…30																																					ሺ9ሻ 
ܵܦ௧ ൌ 1ܶ െ 1 ෍ ሺܣ ௧ܸ െ ܣܸതതതതሻ
ଶ
ିଷଵ
௧ୀି଺଴
																																			ሺ10ሻ 
ܣܸതതതത ൌ 1ܶ ෍ ܣ ௧ܸ
ିଷଵ
௧ୀି଺଴
																																																				ሺ11ሻ 
Panel A of Table 5 demonstrates the change in trading volume for the whole sample. It 
shows that the mean abnormal daily turnover is positive on most days for both mandatory and 
voluntary suspensions, which is consistent with our assumptions. Both ratios show a big increase 
immediately after the suspension, but there is no significant difference between mandatory and 
voluntary suspensions. 
Figure 3 illustrates such patterns of abnormal trading volume for both suspensions. The 
abnormal trading volume for the four types of voluntary suspensions is presented in Panel B of 
Table 5. The results show that the abnormal trading volume is significantly positive from days 
-30 to +30. However, the magnitude of change is not the same among the four subgroups. 
Announcement suspensions and special suspensions trigger much bigger increase in volume than 
the other two categories. 
[Figure 3, Table 5 about here] 
3.4. Regression Analysis 
In this section, we estimate a regression model to explain the effects of trading 
suspensions with variables mainly divided into three broad categories: corporate governance, 
accounting variables and suspension duration.  
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As the purpose of suspensions is to ensure that all investors have equal access to market 
information, it is interesting to examine whether, factors influencing information transparency, 
could play a role in the effects of suspension. A number of studies have shown that better 
corporate governance enhances the accuracy of information disclosure (Bailey et al., 2006; 
Fidrmuc 2015). China is not an exception. He and Rui (2016) investigate the effect of ownership 
structure on the information transmission of insiders trading, and find that firm-level governance 
can serve as an alternative mechanism to enhance information transparence in China’s listed 
firms. Therefore, we expect that the structure of corporate governance, e.g. ownership structure, 
has a significant impact on the efficiency of trading suspension. More specifically, we include 
shareholding pledge ratio and ownership concentration ratio. Besides, previous studies analyzing 
the abnormal effect of individual stock find that accounting variables are important determinants. 
Banz (1981) shows that firms’ sizes and their industries have significant impact on the risk 
adjusted returns. A number of studies show that corporate’s earnings are strongly related with 
stock return (Liu et al., 2000; Jiao, 2011). Thus, we control ROE, the logarithm of asset amount 
and industry dummy in the regression. Ackert et al. (2001) shows that temporary halts and 
mandated closures affect differently in stock return, so it is necessary to include the duration of 
suspension in our analysis. A year dummy is also included to test if the suspensions effects are 
stable across the years. The regression model is as follows: 
Y ൌ α ൅ ߚଵ݈ܲ݁݀݃݁ܲݎ݋݌ ൅ ߚଶ݄ܵܽݎ݁ܥ݋݊ ൅ ߚଷܴܱܧ ൅ ߚସܮ݋݃஺௦௦௘௧ ൅ ߚହܶ݅݉݁݌݁ݎ݀ 
൅ߛܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	 ൅ ߜܻ݁ܽݎ																																																														ሺ12ሻ 
where Y is the dependent variable; ݈ܲ݁݀݃݁ܲݎ݋݌ refers to shareholding pledge ratio; ݄ܵܽݎ݁ܥ݋݊ 
refers to ownership concentration, measured by the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder; 
ܴܱܧ refers to return on equity; ܮ݋݃஺௦௦௘௧ refers to the logarithmic form of asset amount; and 
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Timeperd refers to suspension duration. ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ is an industry dummy variable, and ܻ݁ܽݎ 
is a time dummy variable. All independent variables data are drawn from the CSMAR database. 
Table 6 shows the regression results.  
For the results of abnormal returns, while ownership concentration has positive and 
significant effect on both suspensions, suspension duration has negative and significant effect on 
both suspensions. For the results of variance ratios, we only report the results of samples over 
days -15 to +15. The shareholding pledge ratio has a positive effect. The ownership 
concentration ratio has negative impact. Duration of suspension has positive influence because a 
long suspension period will reduce liquidity. For the results of abnormal trading turnover ratios, 
no variable has significant impact on mandatory suspensions, except on suspension duration. The 
shareholding pledge ratio and ownership concentration have significant positive effects, while 
the logarithm of asset amount has negative effect on voluntary suspensions.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we compare the market reactions to mandatory suspensions and voluntary 
suspensions in Chinese stock markets. We find that there is information leakage in the 
pre-suspension period, and stock prices adjust to new information incompletely during 
suspensions, so the pre-suspension trend continues in the post-suspension period. We further 
divide the voluntary sample into good-news and bad-news subsample and find that the price 
discovery process starts prior to the suspension in both subsample. In the bad-news subsample, 
this phenomenon can be explained by information leakage or the situation that the company calls 
a suspension in order to prevent further decline in stock price. In the post-suspension period, 
16 
 
there is a price drift phenomenon in both good-news and bad-news subsamples. The good-news 
subsample is shown more effective than the voluntary suspensions in disseminating information. 
Our results show that trading volatility increases in the post-suspension period, and the 
post-suspension volatility is relatively higher for voluntary suspensions than for mandatory 
suspensions. The trading volatility of mandatory sample drops as the event window is enlarged, 
while voluntary suspensions show an increase in volatility. We also find that turn-over rises 
significantly in the post-suspension period for both suspensions, and the magnitude of abnormal 
trading volume is the highest on the first day of resumption of trade for the voluntary sample and 
the second day of reopening of trade for mandatory suspensions.  
Finally, our findings suggest that suspensions do not react to unusual market activities 
efficiently. Ownership structure and suspension duration may help explain the ineffectiveness of 
suspensions.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Classification Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Subsample Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Announcement suspension  4130  3179 
Special suspension 495 2609 422 7024 
Additional issuance plans  17  18 
Shareholder’s meeting  8956  9694 
Total  495 15712 422 19915 
     
Notes:  
The table reports the summary statistics of trading suspensions over the period of May 2005 to December 2016 in China’s A-Share Market. 
Mandatory suspension refers to regulator-initiated suspension, while voluntary suspension refers to issuer-initiated suspension. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Durations of suspensions 
Durations Mean Median St. Dev. 25% 50% 75% 99% 
By types 
Mandatory  4.66 4 10.25 4 4 4 16 
Voluntary  22.24 4 74.91 4 4 4 392 
By exchange        
Shanghai 12.72 4 48.45 4 4 4 285 
Shenzhen 29.03 4 88.66 4 4 8 448 
By reasons 
Announcement suspension 3.57 1 20.34 1 1 1 52 
Special suspension 65.97 16 126.32 4 16 56 536 
Additional issuance plans 13.94 12 2.03 12 12 16 16 
Shareholder’s meeting 3.96 4 0.34 4 4 4 12 
Notes:  
The table reports the durations of trading suspensions by suspensions initiator, exchange and reasons. According to CSMAR, the trading hours 
are 9:30-11:30 (morning session) and 1:30-3:30 (afternoon session). Thus, a four hours’ suspension equals to one day’s suspension. 
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Table 3: Excess Return around Suspensions 
Panel A Whole sample 
Panel B Voluntary suspensions 
Window [-30,-1] [-10,-1] [-5,-1] 0 [1,5] [1,10] [1,30] 
Good-news 
Mean -0.94*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.06*** -0.015 0.065*** -0.14*** 
St. Dev 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.00 0.015 0.015 0.017 
T-stat -49.85 15.78 15.07 130.32 -1.02 4.27 -8.11 
Wilcoxon -94.01*** 27.12*** 6.89*** 13.53*** -1.21* 35.56*** -50.04*** 
Bad-news 
Mean -2.25*** -0.43*** -0.99*** -0.02*** -0.28*** -0.77*** -1.83*** 
St. Dev 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.02 0.015 0.015 0.17 
T-stat -120.12 -27.49 -6.45 -150.43 -27.25 -40.98 -110.23 
Wilcoxon -91.17*** -35.27*** -9.18*** -1.98** -31.27*** -45.27*** -62.19*** 
 
Notes:  
The table presents estimations of the excess returns around the suspension period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Window [-30,-1] [-10,-1] [-5,-1] 0 [1,5] [1,10] [1,30] 
Mandatory suspensions 
Mean -2.84*** -0.42*** -0.10 -0.002* -0.46*** -0.97*** -1.54*** 
St. Dev 0.08 0.07 0.067 0.001 0.06 0.07 0.08 
T-stat -33.91 -6.021 -1.53 -1.62 -6.71 -14.00 -20.28 
Wilcoxon  -29.65*** -5.52*** -1.69* -1.97* -6.13*** -8.68*** -14.77*** 
Voluntary suspensions 
Mean -1.62*** -0.082*** 0.0712*** -0.0004** -0.28*** -0.44*** -1.15*** 
St. Dev 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.0002 0.016 0.017 0.012 
T-stat -120.13 -7.49 6.23 -2.04 -27.24 -40.98 -92.24 
Wilcoxon -94.01*** -27.12*** 6.89*** -12.69*** -29.22*** -35.56*** -50.04*** 
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Table 4: Variance Ratios for Voluntary and Mandatory Suspension 
Panel A The whole sample 
Windows [-15,+15] [-30,+30] [-60,+60] 
Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Mean 0.25*** 0.67*** 0.17*** 0.73*** 0.11*** 1.35*** 
St. Dev 0.014 0.024 0.011 0.037 0.0051 0.038 
T-stat 17.42 27.53 15.14 19.79 24.21 33.63 
Difference  
(Mandatory-Voluntary) 
-0.42*** 
-2.78 
 -0.56*** 
-2.43 
 -1.19*** 
-4.95 
 
Wilcoxon -2.14**  -2.33**  -5.17***  
Panel B Types of voluntary suspensions 
Window [-15,+15] [-30,+30] [-60,+60] 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Mean 0.70*** 0.76*** -0.60* 0.61*** 1.99*** 0.60*** -0.28* 0.30*** 4.94*** 0.72*** -0.24** 0.16*** 
St. Dev 0.042 0.034 0.031 0.043 0.17 0.016 0.019 0.017 0.19 0.011 0.017 0.018 
T-stat 16.23 22.19 -1.82 15.51 11.32 36.90 -1.55 30.79 26.75 70.00 -2.49 52.48 
             
 
Note: 
The variance ratio is defined as 
ఙ೛೚ೞ೟మ
ఙ೛ೝ೐మ െ 1where refers ߪ௣௥௘
ଶ ሺߪ௣௢௦௧ଶ ሻrefers to the pre-(post-) suspension variance calculated over event windows 
(e.g., 15 days, 30 days and 60 days) before (after) the suspension for each event, and then averaged across all the sample events. In addition, 1, 2 
3, 4 refers to the different types of voluntary suspensions. 1: Announcement Suspension; 2: Special suspensions; 3: Additional issuance plans; 4: 
Shareholder’s meeting.  
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Table 5: Abnormal Trading Turnover around Suspensions 
Panel A The whole sample 
Days relative 
to the event 
day 
Mandatory Voluntary 
Mean(%) T-stat Mean(%) T-stat 
-30 1.04*** 18.24 1.03*** 91.69 
-20 0.99*** 15.69 0.99*** 91.52 
-10 0.93*** 16.92 0.97*** 92.73 
-5 0.98*** 16.48 0.97*** 90.98 
-1 1.44*** 17.08 1.46*** 93.34 
0 1.66*** 17.96 1.62*** 99.54 
1 1.92*** 21.38 1.58*** 95.54 
5 1.21*** 17.13 1.32*** 92.72 
10 1.16*** 14.97 1.17*** 89.11 
20 0.97*** 14.62 1.03*** 88.03 
30 0.78*** 13.98 0.97*** 83.54 
Panel B Types of voluntary suspensions 
Days relative 
to the event 
day 
Announcement 
Suspension 
Special 
Suspension 
Additional 
Plan 
Shareholder’s 
Meeting 
Mean(%) Mean(%) Mean(%) Mean(%) 
-30 1.02** 1.26** 0.21** 1.02** 
-20 0.96** 1.30** 0.13** 0.29** 
-10 1.00** 1.12*** 0.08** 0.87** 
-5 1.02*** 1.23*** 0.46** 0.79** 
-1 2.04*** 1.45*** 1.26*** 0.75*** 
0 2.82*** 1.74*** 1.41*** 0.77*** 
1 2.72*** 1.94*** 1.21*** 1.00*** 
5 1.83*** 2.18*** 0.64** 0.77** 
10 1.61** 1.73*** 0.52** 0.76** 
20 1.37** 1.45** 0.23** 0.75* 
30 1.07** 1.29** 0.005* 0.68* 
 
Note: 
Normal turnover ratio is defined as the average daily turnover in day -60 to -31 relative to the suspension day. Abnormal turnover ratio, 
expressed as a percentage, is the daily turnover ratio minus the average daily turnover in the estimation period, relative to the daily average 
turnover ratio.  
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Table 6: Regression Analysis 
 
 Excess Return Variance Ratio Turnover Ratio 
Voluntary  Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary  Mandatory 
PledgeProp 0.12 
(1.31) 
-0.18 
(0.85) 
0.003*** 
(5.24) 
0.009*** 
(5.36) 
0.007*** 
(2.18) 
0.054 
(1.50) 
ShareCon 0.003*** 
(3.11) 
0.042*** 
(6.19) 
-0.005*** 
(-5.94) 
-0.002 
(-1.37) 
0.016*** 
(2.18) 
-0.018 
(-0.72) 
ROE 0.021 
(0.88) 
1.15*** 
(5.87) 
0.006*** 
(6.71) 
-3.54*** 
(-9.65) 
0.005* 
(1.75) 
-1.82 
(-0.21) 
Log_Asset 0.10*** 
(11.31) 
-0.53*** 
(-8.06) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.16*** 
(5.13) 
-0.40*** 
(-9.25) 
-0.56 
(-1.44) 
Timeperd -0.12*** 
(-47.26) 
-0.07*** 
(-10.18) 
0.002*** 
(18.61) 
0.007 
(0.55) 
0.012*** 
(2.76) 
0.40** 
(2.14) 
Year 1.11*** 
(20.35) 
0.87*** 
(23.27) 
-0.58*** 
(-53.15) 
0.12* 
(1.75) 
0.15** 
(2.03) 
0.92 
(1.09) 
Cons -2.22*** 
(-20.42) 
-1.74*** 
(-23.25) 
2.06*** 
(53.31) 
-0.37*** 
(-4.36) 
-2.72*** 
(-29.79) 
2.56*** 
(-12.25) 
 
Note: 
The regression model is ܻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ݈ܲ݁݀݃݁ܲݎ݋݌ ൅ ߚଶ݄ܵܽݎ݁ܥ݋݊ ൅ ߚଷܴܱܧ ൅ ߚସܮ݋݃_ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ൅ ߚହܶ݅݉݁݌݁ݎ݀ ൅ ߛܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ൅ ߜܻ݁ܽݎ. Here 
Industry is a dummy variable. 
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Figure 1: Suspensions events over 2006-2016 
 
Note: The figure depicts the number of trading halts over 2006-2016. Since we need to ensure to have at least 60 trading days to calculate excess 
return, the events in 2016 only calculated until September. 
 
 
Figure 2: Excess return distribution for Mandatory and Voluntary Suspensions  
A. Mandatory Suspension 
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Figure 3: Abnormal Trading Volume for Mandatory and Voluntary Suspensions  
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